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INTRODUCTION 
This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for 
purposes of antitrust analysis, what is "market power" or "monopoly 
power"? The question should be well settled because antitrust law now re-
quires proof of actual or likely market power or monopoly power to establish 
most types of antitrust violations. These legal rules follow prevailing anti-
trust policy analysis, which suggests that concepts of market power or mo-
nopoly power should play a crucial role in defining the reach of most 
antitrust proscriptions. 
Examination of key antitrust law opinions, however, shows that courts de-
fine "market power" and "monopoly power" in ways that are both vague and 
inconsistent. We conclude that the present level of confusion is unnecessary 
and results from two different but related errors: (1) the belief or suspicion 
that market power and monopoly power are two different concepts, when 
they are in fact, for antitrust purposes, qualitatively identical, and (2) the 
failure to recognize that anticompetitive economic power may manifest itself 
in two distinct ways. We argue that attempting to distinguish between mar-
ket power and monopoly power creates a false dichotomy. Real differences, 
with significant legal and policy implications, do exist, however, between an-
ticompetitive economic power that is exercised by restricting one's own out-
put and such power exercised by restricting the output of one's rivals. 
Identifying this fundamental distinction and discarding the false one can help 
to clarify other troublesome antitrust issues as well. 
The body of this article describes these conclusions, and the bases for 
them, in some detail. The appendix presents a shorter, more technical de-
scription of the principal argument. Readers already familiar with the main 
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body of antitrust law and conversant with antitrust economics may wish to 
begin by reading the appendix. 
I. THE RELEVANCE OF MONOPOLY POWER AND MARKET POWER 
TO ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 
A. FORMAL LEGAL STANDARDS 
Most antitrust rules require the plaintiff to show that the defendant has or 
is likely to obtain "market power" or "monopoly power." The offense of 
monopolization requires, of course, proof that the defendant has monopoly 
power.! An illegal attempt to monopolize occurs, according to the majority 
view, only when there is a dangerous probability that the defendant will suc-
ceed in obtaining a monopoly.2 The Department of Justice measures the an-
titrust legality of corporate mergers against a set of guidelines whose 
"unifying theme" is said to be "that mergers should not be permitted to cre-
ate or enhance 'market power' or to facilitate its exercise."3 The first step in 
determining the antitrust legality of joint ventures for research and develop-
ment or for production is to ask whether the partners, if merged, would 
achieve market power.4 According to the Supreme Court's latest formula-
tion, a tying arrangement is not illegal unless the seller has "market power" 
in the tying product.s Virtually any summary of the relevant factors in a case 
to be judged under the "rule of reason" will include the presence or absence 
of "market power" as a key factor.6 
Certain antitrust violations, conventionally described as "per se" offenses, 
do not require proof of market or monopoly power.7 Indeed, the label "per 
se" seems to point to the irrelevance of market power. An essential charac-
teristic of a "per se" offense, however, seems to be that it constitutes behavior 
that, if engaged in by a firm with market power, would be egregiously an-
ticompetitive.8 Market power is treated as irrelevant only because "per se" 
offenses involve behavior that courts have determined virtually always lacks 
plausible efficiency justifications; no harm is done, therefore, by conqemning 
the practice without undergoing the expense of an inquiry into monopoly or 
market power.9 
1. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966). 
2. P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW ~ 820 (1978). 
3. U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984). 
4. T. BRUNNER, T. KRA'ITENMAKER, R. SKITOL & A. WEBSTER, MERGERS !N THE NEW AN-
TITRUST ERA 69-72 (1985). Of course, joint ventures may contain agreements that constitute per se 
violations of the Sherman Act. 
5. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16-17 (1984). 
6. Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334-35 (7th Cir. 1986). 
7. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SECOND) § 22 (ABA 1984). 
8. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). 
9. Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294 
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corporation's headquarters from a small town to a big city;16 because it is 
part of a trend toward lessening the number of single-store groceries;17 be-
cause it may eliminate a potential market entrant to whom no firm in the 
market pays any attention;18 and because it may eliminate competition 
among firms that mayor may not compete in a relevant market. 19 Con-
versely, certain agreements among competitors to restrict their outputs have 
been held permissible because they permitted a dying industry to keep up its 
profits until rigor mortis set in;20 because they enabled firms to shorten their 
work days;21 and because they assisted firms who wished not to compete to 
achieve that goal.22 
These opinions cannot all be correct. If antitrust law is required to maxi-
mize simultaneously the welfare of small communities, the number of Mom-
and-Pop stores, the absolute freedom of entry, all interfirm competition, the 
wealth of creditors of firms nearing bankruptcy, workers' leisure time, and 
the ability of firms to avoid competing with each other, then antitrust law is 
paralyzed. Most business behavior will advance at least one of these interests 
while retarding at least one other. 
Today, a consensus is emerging that the solution to this dilemma is not to 
call on antitrust enforcers and judges to balance, in some unstated fashion, 
every social, political, or economic interest or value affected by a business 
decision. Rather, antitrust should be viewed as "a consumer welfare pre-
scription."23 Under this interpretation, a practice restrains trade, mono-
polizes, is unfair, or tends to lessen competition if it harms consumers by 
reducing the value or welfare they would have obtained from the market-
place absent the practice.24 
Deciding to interpret the antitrust laws to fashion rules designed to protect 
16. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 541-42 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
17. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966). 
18. Falstaff, 410 U.S. at 537. 
19. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966). 
20. National Assoc. of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403, 412 (1923). 
21. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918). 
22. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 376-77 (1933). 
23. R. BORK, THE ANTrrRusr PARADOX 66 (1978); see R. POSNER, ANTITRUsr LAW: AN 
EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 18 (1976) (one political argument is that monopoly power transfers 
wealth from consumers to stockholders of monopolistic firms). This is not to deny that social or 
political values have a role to play in setting antitrust rules. For example, Lande has argued that 
the legislative history of the Sherman Act shows that Congress intended the antitrust laws to pro-
tect small business to the extent that this could be accomplished without harming consumers. 
Lande, supra note 11, at 101-05, 120-21, 139-40; see Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 
127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979) (discussing political values involved in antitrust). 
24. This appears to be the rationale underlying such Supreme Court opinions as Continental 
T.V., Jnc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 
(1979); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); NCAA v. Board of 
Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); and Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing 
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Market power or monopoly power, then, is a crucial and central issue in 
almost any complex antitrust case today. Even for the theoretically simpler 
cases involving claims of "per se" violations, the concepts of market and 
monopoly power lurk in the shadows because these concepts are relevant to 
the threshold question of whether the type of behavior at issue is properly 
characterized as "per se" illegal. 10 
B. POLICY ANALYSIS 
. The widespread and increasing emphasis on the role of market power in 
antitrust rules fits well with the current dominant strains of antitrust policy 
analysis. Indeed, antitrust law's increasing absorption of market power stan-
dards is due in some measure to the influence of these analytical theories. 
Confusion exists over the theoretical bases of antitrust law, confusion 
which stems directly from the fact that no one can tell from the plain lan-
guage of the predominant antitrust statutesll what interests they are 
designed to protect. Section one of the Sherman Act forbids "restraint of 
trade";12 section two makes it unlawful to "monopolize" or "attempt to mo-
nopolize;"13 the Federal Trade Commission Act forbids "unfair methods of 
competition;"14 and the Clayton Act condemns tying arrangements, exclu-
sive dealing contracts, and mergers that may "substantially lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly."15 None of these phrases has any fixed 
meaning. Indeed, it is questionable whether a more ambiguous antitrust stat-
ute could be devised. 
Because the statutes do not explicitly tell judges whose interests to protect, 
judges feel free to choose their own favorite candidates. Consequently, 
Supreme Court Justices have expressed the opinions, in various cases, that a 
corporate merger might be held illegal because it would lead to removing a 
(1985). Another reason for per se rules is to provide clear signals to business and to increase judi-
cial economy. 
10. Indeed, the Supreme Court made this link explicitly in the Hyde case when it held that tie-ins 
are per se illegal, but only if the seller has market power in the tying product. Jefferson Parish Hosp. 
Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16-17 (1984). 
11. The statutes are collected as appendix A to M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PrrOFSKY & H. 
GOLDSCHMID, TRADE REGULATION (2d ed. 1983). When we refer in this article to "antitrust 
law," we have in mind the case law flowing from these statutes. Despite the different language in 
the various antitrust statutes, there is no indication that Congress intended to require different types 
of economic power under the different statutes. See Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and 
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HAsTINGS L.J. 65 
(1982) (discussing goals of various antitrust statutes). 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). 
14. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). 
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982). 
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consumer welfare, however, does not make antitrust analysis uncomplicated 
or as readily predictable as the late-season demise of the Boston Red Sox. 
For example, the precise meaning of "consumer welfare" is debatable.25 
Further, antitrust analysis often requires predicting what may happen in the 
future as a result of recent or proposed behavior.26 Predicting the effects of 
behavior on future consumer welfare is no easier than, say, predicting its 
effects on the number of Mom-and-Pop grocery stores.27 
Whatever the merits of this view, treating consumer welfare as the key 
interest in antitrust law brings market power to center stage. Consumer wel-
fare is reduced most obviously when market prices exceed competitive levels. 
When economists use the terms "market power" or "monopoly power," they 
usually mean the ability to price at a supracompetitive level. 28 The view of 
consumer welfare as the central policy goal of antitrust therefore suggests 
that the law of antitrust is correct as it increasingly focuses on market power. 
II. JUDICIAL DEFINITIONS OF MARKET POWER AND MONOPOLY POWER 
Today, courts appear to be confused about whether market power and 
monopoly power are similar or distinct concepts. Furthermore, because the 
definitions that have evolved for market power and monopoly power may be 
incompatible, courts may face the difficult task of determining which stan-
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). See Lande, supra note 11, at 67 n.2 (emphasizing judicial uncertainty of 
goals of antitrust laws). 
25. See Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power 
over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 279-81 (1986) (highlighting complexities in defining consumer wel-
fare); H. HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRuST LAW 45-49 (1985) (notion of con-
sumer welfare is ambiguous, but often used to mean optimal allocative efficiency). 
Some believe that the congressional concern for "consumer welfare" amounts to nothing more 
than a desire to enhance economic efficiency. Those analysts believe that the only cognizable harm 
from market power is allocative inefficiency. See generally R. BORK, supra note 23, at 72-89. Others 
argue that the "consumer welfare" Congress intended to protect is a broader concept. They believe 
that Congress disapproved of market power principally because it "unfairly" extracts wealth from 
consumers. See generally Lande, supra note 11, at 65 (discussing goals of antitrust law). 
26. For example, those with a pure economic efficiency orientation would first determine 
whether a challenged practice would cause supracompetitive pricing. If so, they would balance the 
resulting allocative inefficiency against any accompanying production efficiency gains. See generally 
Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381 
(1980) (explicating theory in detail). Those with a consumer perspective also would start by asking 
whether the practice could result in market power. If so, they would condemn the practice unless it 
also generated production efficiencies large enough to prevent prices from rising. See Fisher & 
Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1580 (1983) (discuss-
ing efficiencies); Fisher, Lande & Vandaele, Afterword: Could a Merger Lead to Both a Monopoly 
and Lower Price?, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1697 (1983) (same). 
27. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 25, at 253-66 (measuring likelihood and magnitUde of 
anticompetitive effects); Fisher & Lande, supra note 26 (discussing elements involved in prediction). 
28. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSfRIAL MARKET STRUCfURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 14-
16 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing economic meaning of market power and monopoly power). 
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dard is more appropriate for the various types of antitrust violations.29 We 
believe that market power and monopoly power are qualitatively identical 
concepts-both terms refer to anticompetitive economic power that ulti-
mately can compromise consumer welfare. Courts should be less concerned 
with labeling the type of anticompetitive economic power exerted by a firm; 
rather, they should focus on the methods by which this power is achieved. 
Supreme Court opinions demonstrate a marked inconsistency as to 
whether market power and monopoly power are similar or distinct concepts. 
We can find no Supreme Court opinion that contrasts the terms "market 
power" and "monopoly power" deliberately and explicitly, i.e., that finds the 
existence of one but not the other. Recently, in Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,30 Justice Powell's majority opinion appeared 
to use both terms to mean the power to price profitably above cost.31 Other 
Supreme Court opinions also appear to treat market power and monopoly 
power as identical concepts.32 
Despite these references, however, the Supreme Court, in. other cases, 
seems to have articulated standards for "monopoly power" and "market 
power" that, at least linguistically, are incompatible. In NCAA v. Board of 
Regents,33 the Court defined "market power" as "the ability to raise prices 
above those that would be charged in a competitive market."34 By contrast, 
29. In some cases, the terms of the authority defining the antitrust violation will specify whether 
"market power" or "monopoly power" should be used to label the anticompetitive economic power 
at issue. For example, § 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to "monopolize" or "attempt to 
monopolize." In a case brought under § 2, therefore, the "monopoly power" standard would be 
applicable. If "market power" and "monopoly power" are qualitatively identical, the label used to 
describe the conduct in question should make little practical difference. Of course, even under our 
unified approach, courts would have to identify quantitatively lower degrees or probabilities of mar-
ket power to interdict a merger under § 7 of the Clayton Act than to proscribe a monopoly under 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act. 
If, on the other hand, "market power" and "monopoly power" are fundamentally different, 
courts may be required to determine which standard is appropriate in cases where the authority 
defining the antitrust violation prohibits only something as ambiguous as a "restraint of trade" or 
an "unfair method of competition." 
30. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
31. Id. at 1358. 
32. See Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 486 n.3 (1968) (market power); 
id. at 486 (monopoly power); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 580 (1966) (market 
power); id. at 577 (monopoly power). 
In Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), Justice White's dissent-
ing opinion appears to define "market power" as a lesser degree of economic power than "monopoly 
power." Id. at 510 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan, J.). Perhaps for reasons such as this, 
Posner at one time described market power as a "debased" form of monopoly power. R. POSNER, 
supra note 23, at 102. 
33. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
34. Id. at 109 n.38. This is the Court's most recent definition of market power. Although the 
Court in NCAA articulated a definition of "market power" that was linguistically different from the 
definition of "monopoly power" articulated in du Pont, the NCAA Court nonetheless cited du Pont 
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the Supreme Court has consistently defined "m,onopoly power," at least for 
section two cases, in accordance with the definition articulated in United 
States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.35-i.e., as "the power to control 
prices or exclude competition."36 Strictly construed, the Court's language 
appears to require a higher burden of proof to establish "market power" than 
to demonstrate "monopoly power," because proof of a defendant's ability to 
exclude competition would not suffice to demonstrate the existence of "mar-
ket power." Moreover, even the price portion of the du Pont monopoly 
power definition is broader than the NCAA market power standard because 
the latter ignores the ability to prevent price decreases. 
Economists use both "market power" and "monopoly power" to refer to 
the power of a single firm or group of firms to price profitably above marginal 
cost.37 Less technically, the terms both refer to the ability to price above 
competitive levels.38 Of course, this anticompetitive economic power can ex-
ist in varying degrees. One firm may be able to price well above competitive 
levels consistently and profitably while another may be able only to price 
slightly above the competitive norm for a short time. But the type of power 
described is qualitatively identical in both cases. 
We believe that antitrust law should dispense with the idea that market 
power and monopoly power are different concepts. Rather, courts should 
focus on distinguishing clearly between two alternative and independent 
methods of achieving anticompetitive economic power.39 These two alterna-
for the definition of both terms (id. at 109 n.38 ("market power"); id. at 112 ("monopoly power")). 
The only term used in du Pont, however, is "monopoly power." 
35. 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (decision is sometimes referred to as the Cellophane case). For a critique 
of du Pont, see Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REv. 281 (1956). See 
infra note 75 and accompanying text (explicating "Cellophane fallacy"). 
36. Id. at 391. The Court reiterated the du Pont formulation in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 
384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966), and in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
596 n.20 (1985). 
37. The concept of marginal cost is easy to state. In practice, however, marginal cost sometimes 
is controversial to define and difficult to measure. These complications are beyond the scope of this 
article. 
38. In a perfectly competitive market, firms take the market price as given. That is, as price-
takers they ignore any effects of their production decisions on the market price. In such a market, 
each firm maximizes its profits by expanding its output until its marginal cost (i.e., its cost of pro-
ducing an additional unit) equals the market price (i.e., the firm's perceptions of the additional 
revenue the unit of output will create). In a perfectly competitive market, all firms have the same 
marginal cost at the levels of output they produce. More efficient firms (i.e., those with lower 
marginal costs for particular levels of output) produce more output. They earn higher profits be-
cause they have lower average costs, although their marginal costs at the level of output they pro-
duce is the same as their less efficient competitors. 
39. Other precepts of antitrust law demonstrate the appropriateness of focusing antitrust analysis 
on the method by which anticompetitive economic power is achieved. For example, the existence of 
monopoly power is not considered "per se" illegal under the antitrust laws. If a firm acquires 
monopoly power from superior skill, foresight, and industry, or if monopoly power is granted by the 
government, a firm will not be deemed to have committed an antitrust violation. See United States 
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tive routes roughly correspond to the twin prongs of the du Pont formula-
tion, achieving supracompetitive prices by exercising either the power to 
control prices or the power to exclude competition. Proof of either element 
should suffice when market power or monopoly power is required. 
III. TOWARD A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION 
None of the various judicial formulations recounted above is fundamen-
tally erroneous. Although the standards articulated may stand at odds with 
each other when the courts' language is strictly interpreted, the tests they 
imply are not radically incompatible. Rather, most judicial formulations 
treat market power and monopoly power as roughly identical, but leave un-
clear whether they are precisely the same and, if not, which is the lesser 
degree of anticompetitive power. Further, reflecting the present antitrust 
policy consensus, these judicial definitions of market power and monopoly 
power focus on the phenomenon of pricing above competitive levels, but they 
leave unclear certain associated issues, particularly whether anticompetitive 
power includes the ability to prevent prices from falling or the power to ex-
clude competition. 
We believe that these marginal ambiguities and inconsistencies stem from 
a sensible judicial intuition that has not been clearly expressed. In brief, 
judges have correctly perceived that the economic power antitrust law seeks 
to avoid is two-dimensional; however, the distinction arises not from the type 
of power achieved but from the manner in which it may be exercised. Our 
central argument is that precision in defining this central concept in antitrust 
law and policy could be achieved by treating monopoly power and market 
power as qualitatively identical, but recognizing explicitly that anticompeti-
tive power can be exercised by either of two methods: raising one's own 
prices or raising competitors' costs. These two methods of exercising market 
power correspond, respectively, to the "power to control price" and "power 
to exclude competitors" distinction expressed in the du Pont formulation. 
Both methods reduce consumer welfare.4O Once this distinction is made, one 
then can distinguish among degrees of economic power. This quantitative 
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945) (no § 2 violation simply because 
monopoly power was thrust upon a firm). An antitrust violation will exist, however, if a firm 
achieves monopoly power by collusion. The method of achieving power, therefore, is of paramount • 
importance while the label used to describe the anticompetitve ~onomic power in question is of 
minimal concern. 
40. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 977 (1981) 
(suggesting a similar distinction); see also infra note 57 (discussing view of Landes and Posner on 
definition of market power in Cellophane); R. POSNER & F. EAsTERBROOK, ANTrrnusr: CASES, 
EcONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 348 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing market power in 
Cellophane). 
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distinction, however, does not alter the conclusion that market power and 
monopoly power are qUalitatively identical. 
The core concept underlying the notion of market power or monopoly 
power is a firm's ability to increase profits and to harm consumers by charg-
ing prices above competitive levels.41 A single firm or group of firms that is 
not constrained by competition from a sufficient number of equally efficient 
existing and potential competitors can profitably raise price or prevent price 
from falling in two ways.42 
First, the firm or group of firms may raise or maintain price above the 
competitive level directly by restraining its own output ("control price"). 
The power to control price by restraining one's own output is the usual focus 
of Chicago School antitrust analysts.43 For this reason, we denote the power 
to control price profitably, directly by restraining one's own output, as classi-
cal or "Stiglerian" market power.44 
Second, the firm or group of firms may raise price above the competitive 
level or prevent it from falling to a lower competitive level by raising its 
rivals' costs and thereby causing them to restrain their output ("exclude 
competition"). Such allegations are at the bottom of most antitrust cases in 
which one firm or group of firms is claimed to have harmed competition by 
foreclosing or excluding its competitors.45 We denote this power as exclu-
sionary or "Bainian" market power.46 Consumer welfare is reduced by the 
exercise of either Stiglerian or Bainian market power.47 
41. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 n.46 (1984). Landes and Posner 
define market power as "the ability of a firm (or group of firms acting together) to raise price above 
the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidiy that the price increase is unprofitable 
and must be rescinded." Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 937. Landes and Posner do not 
distinguish between market power and monopoly power, referring only to the "judicial definition of 
market power set forth in Cel/ophane." ld. at 977 (emphasis ad~ed). 
42. Our focus generally is on price-raising conduct of a single firm. However, the analysis easily 
can be generalized to cooperative or collusive multifirm conduct by substituting the phrase "group 
of firms" for "single firm." It can also be generalized to conduct that prevents prices from fa1ling 
from an initial monopoly level to the competitive level. 
43. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213, 260-83 (1985) (dis-
cussing various forms of strategic behavior that Chicago School has ignored). 
44. This type of market power was extensively analyzed in G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF 
INDUSTRY (1968). 
45. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 25, at 211-30 (discussing the approaches of courts to 
claims of anticompetitive exclusion). 
46. See J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 324-30 (1959) (extensive analysis of these con-
cepts); see also R. BORK, supra note 23, at 156 (on gaining market power by imposing costs on 
rivals). 
47. Academic arguments might arise among antitrust theorists over which form of market power 
is analytically more fundamental. Those who believe that antitrust is on strongest ground in prohib-
iting hard core price fixing among competitors probably would focus on Stiglerian power. How-
ever, as Stigler himself and others have emphasized, successful price fixing of significant duration 
depends on the existence of constraints on new entry. In this sense, exclusion, either natural or as 
the result of deliberate, credible conduct, is the key underpinning to the exercise of market power. 
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We can illustrate these concepts by considering a hypothetical market for 
a hypothetical good called widgets.48 If there are no good substitutes for wid-
gets and only one firm produces widgets, that single firm will have the ability 
to exercise Stiglerian monopoly power directly by reducing its output and 
raising its price, and therefore the market price, to the monopoly level.49 
Consumer welfare and allocative efficiency are sacrificed because the firm 
foregoes sales to those consumers who would be willing to buy widgets at a 
price above the cost of production but who are unwilling to buy at the price 
set by the firm. so 
Bainian market power can be described by altering the market structure in 
the previous example. Suppose instead that 100 firms with identical, rising 
supply curves make widgets and that each produces an equal amount. Sup-
pose further that gadgets, a second product, are a good substitute for widgets 
and vice versa. Given this market structure, consider the effect of a strategy 
by the widget manufacturers that significantly raises the costs of manufactur-
ing gadgets, thereby effectively removing all gadgets from the market.sl This 
would represent an exercise in Bainian monopoly power. As the increased 
cost of gadgets leads gadget producers to shrink their output, the price of 
widgets will rise. 52 Widget makers will benefit as their outputs and market 
shares increase. Their total profits rise, while consumers lose the ability to 
buy gadgets at all and to buy widgets at the lower competitive price. In this 
example, widget firms have exercised Bainian market power, even though 
they could not exercise Stiglerian market power. Consumer welfare and allo-
cative efficiency nonetheless are reduced. 
From the perspective of antitrust policy, the exercise of classical, Stiglerian 
market power and exclusionary, Bainian market power both lead to a con-
sumer welfare loss: restraining output below the efficient competitive level 
denies to consumers products that they value in excess of the marginal cost 
Thus, Bainian power may be considered more fundamental. See also infra note 54 (discussing the 
effect of Bainian power on production efficiency). 
48. These concepts are further described in the appendix, which provides a more technical illus-
tration of the practices des~ribed here. 
49. That is, to the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
50. The relationship between consumer welfare and allocative efficiency is discussed in H. 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 4549; see Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 25, at 279-81 (discuss-
ing relevance of claims that certain exclusionary behavior is efficient). 
51. For example, suppose that the widget manufacturers use relatively less labor per unit than 
the gadget manufacturers. If the widget manufacturers were able to cause wages to rise for both 
groups, this would raise disproportionately the costs of the gadget manufacturers. Thus, the widget 
producers can gain by achieving a relative cost advantage, even though their own costs rise. See 
Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barner to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 Q.J. ECON. 
85, 113 (1968) (wage increases can create barriers to entry). 
52. As illustrated in figure 2 in the appendix, this result assumes that the supply curve of widgets 
is rising with output. It thus assumes that established widget manufacturers are protected by entry 
barriers and cannot expand output profitably at the current price level. 
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of production. Exercising either type of power reduces allocative efficiency 
and transfers wealth from consumers to the owners of the firms exercising 
monopoly power.53 In addition, for Bainian market power, production effi-
ciency also is reduced. 54 
These two sources of power over price can occur either independently or 
simultaneously. The first example above shows how Stiglerian power can 
exist independently of Bainian power; the second illustrates Bainian power 
without Stiglerian. However, the exercise of Bainian exclusionary power also 
can create classical Stiglerian power. For example, once the gadget produ-
cers' costs have been increased, they will provide a less effective constraint on 
tacit or express collusion by the widget producers. If the widget market is 
sufficiently concentrated and there are barriers to entry and expansion in the 
market, perhaps as a result of the cost increasing strategy, then the widget 
producers may be able to restrain output and raise price still further.55 Fi-
nally, firms that possess Stiglerian power may be better situated to profit 
from raising their rivals' costs because they may stand to gain more from 
such a strategy than their rivals will lose. 56 
Stiglerian market power is fairly well understood. A firm may achieve this 
power from superior skill, foresight and industry, it may be thrust upon it, or 
bestowed by the government. It may also be achieved by collusion or 
merger. 
Although there is virtual unanimity among antitrust commentators in the 
belief that classical, Stiglerian market power can be achieved through an-
ticompetitive means, Bainian market power arising from exclusionary con-
duct directed against rivals is still controversial and has not yet received 
53. This wealth transfer may be converted into an allocative efficiency loss if the producers pro-
tect or enhance their power through rent-seeking behavior and strategic entry deterrence. See gen-
erally Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs. Monopolies. and Theft, 7 W. EcON. J. 224 (1967); 
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974). Alterna-
tively, it may create offsetting long run efficiency benefits by providing added incentives for cost-
reducing innovations and new products in much the same way as the potential for receiving a patent 
increases incentives to innovate. See W. BOWMAN, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL 
AND EcONOMIC ApPRAISAL 2-4 (1973). 
54. Production efficiency is reduced in two ways. First, aggregate industry costs are not mini-
mized since firms no longer produce in strict accordance with their underlying, relative costs. Sec-
ond, assuming they do not exit the market altogether, disadvantaged rivals no longer produce 
efficiently at minimum cost. This raises the cost to society of producing their remaining output. 
These production efficiency losses can be substantial. Thus, the exercise of Bainian exclusionary 
power can be described as a form of rent-seeking that produces social losses beyond the usual dead-
weight efficiency loss associated with the exercise of classical Stiglerian power. The exercise of 
Bainian power, however, does not always create a loss in production efficiency. Sometimes the 
exercise of Bainian power generates offsetting increases in the production efficiency of the excluding 
firm. In these cases, net production efficiency may rise or fall. 
55. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 25, at 244-47. 
56. Id. at 268-71. 
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extensive, systematic exposition and analysis in the antitrust literature.s7 
Some antitrust commentators deny the real world ability to exercise Bainian 
market power because of a large number of factors, including allegedly per-
vasive and intense competition, an assumption that potentially excluded ri-
vals can protect themselves, and a belief that suppliers and customers 
supposedly will be unwilling to be parties to an exclusionary strategy. Others 
believe that Bainian market power can never exist absent Stiglerian power. 
These assertions are addressed-and, we believe, rebutted-in previous ar-
ticles.58 It is not our purpose to repeat the details of those analyses here. In 
brief, anticompetitive, exclusionary, Bainian market power occurs when an 
excluding firm successfully achieves two related goals. First, by denying in-
puts to its rivals, the excluding firm materially raises its rivals' costs. Second, 
by thus precluding the competitive check on its price and output decisions 
that those rivals provide, the excluding firm thereby gains the power to price 
in its output market above the competitive level. For purposes of this article, 
we accept these conclusions as established, but note that to date exclusionary 
Bainian power has been more controversial and less well understood than 
classical Stiglerian power. 
It is this controversy, we suspect, that has led judges to be cautious in 
fleshing out the meanings of market power and monopoly power in antitrust 
opinions. Once it is understood, however, that allegations of either Stiglerian 
or Bainian market power make the same ultimate factual claim-that market 
output has been reduced to raise prices59-antitrust judges, enforcers, practi-
tioners, and commentators should be able to agree with three propositions. 
First, antitrust analysis should treat market power and monopoly power as 
qualitatively identical-both terms refer to anticompetitive economic power. 
Second, antitrust analysis should distinguish clearly between classical Stigler-
ian and exclusionary Bainian power. Third, proof of either should satisfy the 
statutory requirement for market or monopoly power. 
57. For example, as discussed supra note 41, Landes and Posner do not distinguish between 
monopoly power and market power, referring to the "judicial definition of market power set forth in 
Cellophane." Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 977 (emphasis added). They go on to say, "The 
first part of this definition [the power to control prices] seems equivalent to the economic definition 
of market power .... The second [power to exclude competition] is puzzling. The Court may just 
have been making the corollary point that any firm that has and exercises the power to raise price 
above the competitive level must also be able to exclude entrants; otherwise it would not be able to 
maintain the higher-than-competitive price .... Finally, the court may have had in mind the exclu-
sion of equally or more efficient competitors through predatory pricing or other exclusionary prac-
tices-a dimension of the monopoly problem to which our analysis does not speak directly." Id. at 
977 (emphasis added). 
58. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 25, at 266-77; Krattenmaker & Salop, Analyzing Anticom-
petitive ExclUSion, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 71, 82-89 (1987). 
59. In special cases, market power may generate price increases unaccompanied by output reduc-
tions, such as perfect price discrimination by a monopolist. 
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Of course, different antitrust issues may, upon analysis, require different 
degrees or probabilities of anticompetitive economic power to prove a viola-
tion. For example, we may require a strong showing of a substantial degree 
of monopoly power before condemning practices that often can generate sub-
stantial efficiencies, but make the presence or absence of market power irrele-
vant in challenges to practices whose sole purpose is to suppress 
competition.60 Similarly, a greater degree of market power may be required 
to constitute an antitrust violation when analyzing practices that are an-
ticompetitive only if certain self-correcting tendencies, presumed to be oper-
ating in most markets, fail to work.61 Or,. to be faithful to legislative intent, 
we may adopt simpler approximations of market power or err on the side of 
overstating or understating the likelihood that a particular degree of concen-
tration reflects monopoly power. 
IV. RELEVANCE OF THE DEFINITION 
A. CLARIFYING THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST 
We have argued that present antitrust law lacks a clear understanding of a 
concept central to the application of that law-the concept of market power 
or monopoly power. If fostering consumer welfare is indeed the primary 
purpose of antitrust law, then the terms "market power" and "monopoly 
power" should have an identical qualitative meaning or definition: the power 
to price profitably above competitive levels. 
Were antitrust enforcers and courts to adopt this definition, the goals of 
antitrust would be better specified and the application of the law clarified. 
Consider, for example, antitrust merger analysis. Case law establishes that 
corporate mergers are unlawful only to the extent that they threaten to create 
or facilitate the exercise of market power by firms in the market.62 Defining 
market power exclusively as the ability to price above competitive levels 
would clarify that law and explain why a merger would not violate the anti-
trust laws simply because it would result in relocating a company's head-
quarters, reducing the number of single-store firms, or enlarging a firm's 
gross cash receipts. Antitrust analysts and enforcers instead would key on 
the relevant question of whether the merger could unreasonably increase the 
likelihood that market prices would rise or remain above competitive 
60. The Supreme Court appears to express a view like this in Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. 
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293-98 (1985). 
61. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 25, at 266-72 (to determine that exclusion is anticom-
petitive might require that excluding firm have significantly larger market share than excluded 
firms, to account for possibility that excluded firms could protect themselves by counterbidding). 
62. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 511 (1974) (merger not unlawful 
when government unable to establish likelihood of substantial lessening of competition in any 
market). 
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B. ANALYZING ANTITRUST CLAIMS BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN 
STIGLERIAN AND BAINIAN POWER 
There remains the task of demonstrating the utility of distinguishing be-
tween the two methods of exercising market power. This section explains 
why courts should draw the distinction between Stiglerian and Bainian 
power and how doing so can clarify the structuring of antitrust inquiries, the 
definition of relevant markets, the measurement of market power, the treat-
ment of unexercised market power, and competitor standing to sue. 
1. When Market Power is at Issue, the Inquiry Always Should Extend to 
Bainian, Exclusionary Power 
We have argued that antitrust law would be rationally clarified if courts 
would recognize that anticompetitive economic power may be exercised in 
either of two ways: by restricting one's own output or by restricting rivals' 
output. Put another way, we should understand the classic du Pont formula-
tion of monopoly (or market) power to mean that a plaintiff must show that 
the defendant has either classical, Stiglerian power or exclusionary, Bainian 
power.64 In this sense, anticompetitive economic power is, as explained in du 
Pont, "the power to control prices or exclude competition."65 
By restricting the market power inquiry to the achievement of Stiglerian 
power, courts unwittingly close their eyes to potential anticompetitive effects. 
In our judgment, courts adjudicating antitrust complaints should routinely 
consider whether the defendant has acquired either classical, Stiglerian 
power or exclusionary, Bainian power. The remainder of this article pro-
vides specific illustrations of how such an approach would facilitate the anal-
ysis of many antitrust issues. 
2. Market Power Cannot be a Threshold Inquiry 
Analysis of market power often is treated as a threshold issue in antitrust 
litigation, to be carried out in an identical fashion irrespective of the defend-
ant's alleged conduct. Indeed, certain antitrust standards call on courts to 
63. This is the fundamental premise on which the Justice Department's merger guidelines are 
based. T. BRUNNER, T. KRATIENMAKER, R. SKITOL & A. WEBSTER, supra note 4, at 13-15. The 
approach described in the text would also enable those who would take account of additional fac-
tors-such as sheer firm size-to explain precisely why they would do so. Is it because the size of 
the firm affects consumer welfare? If not, is it because firm size can be modestly regulated without 
reducing consumer welfare? Or is moderating firm 'size an additional antitrust goal for which one 
must pay with some loss of consumer welfare? 
64. See notes 40-54 and accompanying text (discussing definition of market and monopoly 
power). 
65. United States v. E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
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evaluate the market power of the defendant before any analysis of the defend-
ant's conduct is undertaken.66 This evaluation typically involves a determi-
nation of the defendant's market share in the relevant product market along 
with an analysis of market concentration and entry barriers. 67 
This procedure is seriously flawed for a court concerned with the exercise 
of Bainian market power by a defendant engaged in exclusionary conduct. 
In these cases, the evaluation of Bainian market power is not merely the first 
step of the inquiry; it is the primary focus of the entire analysis. Bainian 
power cannot be evaluated in a vacuum, independent of and prior to analysis 
of the allegedly exclusionary conduct. It is the exclusionary conduct that 
creates the market power being evaluated, not the other way around. 
Yet it is not surprising that this flawed procedure has come about. The 
traditional threshold test focuses on the prior achievement of Stiglerian 
power. Courts that erroneously think that the prior achievement of Stigler-
ian market power is necessary for the achievement or exercise of Bainian 
market power naturally assume that proof of Stiglerian market power is a 
threshold inquiry. However, as demonstrated earlier,68 Stiglerian market 
power is not a prerequisite for a successful exclusionary strategy. Once this 
is recognized, the use of a threshold market power test in exclusion cases is 
unwarranted. 69 
. 
3. Market Definition, Exclusionary Power, and the Department of Justice 
Merger Guidelines 
Our analysis of market power up to now has not involved any explicit 
discussion of market definition. In conventional practice, of course, market 
power and market definition are closely related, because a relevant market is 
that group of firms that significantly constrains each other's pricing and out-
put decisions.7° The Justice Department's merger guidelines adopt that defi-
nition of relevant markets and then elaborate a methodology for applying 
66. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (monopoliza-
tion); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (tie-in sales). 
67. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-31 (1984) (market share of 
hospital insufficient to confer market power); Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 
1325, 1335-40 (7th Cir. 1986) (elastic supply and low market share precluded finding of market 
power); see also infra notes 99-104 and accompanying tht (discuSsing Cargill). 
68. See supra text accompanying note 52 (either type of market power can reduce allocative 
efficiency). 
69. Similarly, this faulty approach appears to have been used in a recent article by Judge Easter-
brook, in which he suggests that courts apply at a preliminary stage a number of "filters" to evalu-
ate the plausibility of antitrust allegations of anticompetitive exclusion. One of those filters is the 
market power of the defendant. See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 14-16 
(1984) (urging use of filters in antitrust). For the use of this market power filter in practice, see 
Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334-37 
(7th Cir. 1986) (market power analysis used to preclude antitrust claim). 
70. T. BRUNNER, T. KRATIENMAKER, R. SKITOL & A. WEBSTER, supra note 4, at 83-84. 
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that definition to specific cases. Unfortunately, however, as presently consti-
tuted that methodology has only limited utility for analysis of allegations of 
Bainian power. 
The Justice Department's merger guidelines71 begin by taking the product 
of one of the merging firms and asking whether a coordinated, significant 
price increase above the current level by all the firms making that product 
would be profitable. The hypothesized increase usually is a five percent price 
rise lasting one year. If the hypothesized increase would be profitable, those 
firms constitute a relevant market.72 
The most obvious problem with this approach, for cases involving claims 
of Bainian power, is that the guidelines will not identify as a relevant market 
the product of a profit-maximizing monopolist, even though such a firm may 
well be able to exercise Bainian power. A single firm that already is maxi-
mizing profits cannot, by definition, increase profits by raising its price fur-
ther. Thus, this single firm cannot constitute a relevant market under the 
Justice Department's approach.73 Consider, for example, the case of a firm 
charged with monopolization for excluding all other producers of a particu-
lar product, but which faces a competitive fringe comprised of a large 
number of small producers of a substitute product, each of which can pro-
duce an unlimited amount at some constant unit cost level. That firm might 
set its price at the level just below the value consumers place on the substi-
tute, such that any further price increase would eliminate virtually all of its 
sales. As a result, under the Justice Department's test, the relevant market 
would include the substitute products. If the firm's share of capacity in that 
broader market was small, the Justice Department would conclude that it 
had no market power.74 Because a finding of market power is a prerequisite 
to a section 2 violation, that firm's exclusionary conduct would be 
immunized.7s 
71. U.s. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, at 26,827-30. 
72. This same methodology is used in § 6 of the Justice Department's vertical restraints guide-
lines. See Justice's Guidelines Allow QUick Look, In-Depth Look For Vertical Restrictions, [Jan.-
June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1199, at 193, 193-95 (Jan. 24, 1985). 
73. In fact, as explained below, the Justice Department's approach also cannot detect already 
exercised Stiglerian market power. One potential solution to this problem would be to expand the 
Justice Department's test to include the effects of price decreases in addition to price increases. If a 
price decrease leads to only a modest increase in sales while a price increase leads to a dramatic 
sales reduction for a firm or group of firms, then that firm or group of firms is likely to have already 
exercised Stiglerian market power. 
74. While this methodology does not logically imply that the firm has no market power, the 
Justice Department's formulation does bias the conclusion in this direction. (It is not a logical 
implication, however, because in the broader market that the Justice Department would recognize, 
the firm could have a market share large enough to satisfy the "leading firm" proviso in ~ 3.12 of 
the merger guidelines. U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, at 26,831). 
75. Of course, this was the faulty approach taken in du Pont. There, the Court committed the 
now classic "Cellophane fallacy" first articulated by Donald Turner in his seminal article, Antitrust 
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The Justice Department's methodology should not be utilized in analyses 
of exclusion for a more general reason as well. Even if the firm's pricing 
currently is constrained by the producers of the substitute, the firm. still may 
be able to exercise Bainian power. As discussed earlier, the firm may be able 
to raise its price by raising the costs of substitutes. The lack of Stiglerian 
market power, therefore, does not preclude the exercise of Bainian market 
power. 
The Justice Department's test can be expanded, however, to evaluate 
Bainian market power. This expansion involves, first, an evaluation of the 
effects of allegedly exclusionary conduct on the input costs of rivals, and 
second, an evaluation of those increased costs on prices in the output markets 
in which the defendant and the excluded rivals compete. These determina-
tions entail inquiries into both the input and output markets and the interac-
tion between competition in the two markets. Unlike the standard 
methodology used by the Justice Department, the analysis of market power 
must involve study of the two markets in tandem. Moreover, as discussed 
above, this determination of market power represents the central focus of the 
analysis, not a threshold inquiry undertaken independently of the analysis of 
the defendant's conduct. 
Once this commitment to the two-market analysis is made, the Justice De-
partment's "five percent test" can be applied to Bainian market power.76 The 
operational language can be restated as follows: Suppose the defendant suc-
ceeds in significantly raising the costs of rivals by the allegedly exclusionary 
conduct under consideration. Would those higher costs being borne by rivals 
allow the defendant profitably to raise its price by five percent? If so, the 
conduct can be said to permit the exercise of Bainian market power. 
This evaluation involves analysis of concentration and entry barriers in the . 
output markets in which the defendant and the excluded rivals compete. 
However, the analysis must account for any effects of the exclusionary con-
Policy and the Cellophane Case, supra note 35 (critical assessment of Court's decision in Cello-
phane). See Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 961 (Court committed economic error in du Pont in 
its discussion of cross-elasticity of demand). In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
351 U.S. 377, 394-400 (1956), the Court found that at prevailing prices cellophane was actively 
competing for sales with other flexible packaging material. The Court then concluded that flexible 
packing material and cellophane were in the same product market, and subsequently ruled that du 
Pont did not have power in this market. Id. at 400. 
This approach is faulty because a monopolist would continue to increase its price until competi-
tion from substitutes constrains further price rises. As Judge Learned Hand observed in Alcoa, 
''There are indeed limits to [a monopolist's] power; substitutes are available for almost all commodi-
ties, and to raise the price enough is to evoke them." Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 425-26. Thus, the price at 
which competition from other flexible wrappings constrained further price increases by du Pont was 
not necessarily the competitive price for cellophane, but rather could instead have been the monop-
oly price. 
76. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 25, at 253-66 (on measuring the likelihood of anticom-
petitive effects). 
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duct under study because exclusionary conduct can significantly alter the 
competitive structure of the output market. For example, even if initially 
there are no entry barriers in the market, exclusionary conduct can create 
entry barriers by raising the costs of potential entrants. If established unex-
cluded competitors face barriers to expansion, or can coordinate prices suc-
cessfully, then the exclusionary conduct can create market power. Similarly, 
the analysis of market concentration is changed. Even if the market initially 
is relatively unconcentrated, the competitive check provided by rivals' capac-
ity is reduced if their costs are raised and that low cost capacity, in effect, is 
removed from the market. This too can lead to the exercise of market power 
if removal of those firms from the market leaves the market of unexcluded 
firms so concentrated that they can then collude successfully or restrict out-
put unilaterally. 
4. Market Power Includes the Power to Prevent Price Decreases 
Exclusionary conduct that reduces the likelihood of price decreases should 
properly be considered a form of monopoly or market power. Preventing 
likely price decreases reduces consumer welfare as much as causing price 
increases. This is important because exclusionary conduct can delay or pre-
vent prices from falling altogether by preventing the entry or raising the costs 
of more efficient potential competitors.77 Unfortunately, this power is not 
captured well by the Justice Department's method of defining markets.78 
The Justice Department's "significant price increase" test would not detect 
the power to prevent price decreases. This inability to detect the power to 
prevent price decreases follows directly from the operational language of the 
guidelines' market definition test-the ability to raise price significantly 
above the current price level,79 
77. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 635 F. Supp. 1287, 1315-18 (D. Kan. 1986). In this 
case, Blue Cross of Kansas terminated its participating hospital agreement with Wesley Hospital 
upon learning of the purchase of a Wichita, Kansas, health maintenance organization by Wesley's 
parent, Hospital Corporation of America. Id. at 1305. The plaintiffs alleged that the tennination of 
Wesley's contract would both raise its costs and reduce its revenues and, by threatening other hospi-
tals with a similar termination, deter the entry of other more efficient arrangements for providing 
health care and health insurance. Id. at 1310. Whether or not Blue Cross had Stiglerian power to 
increase price above the current level, such conduct could prevent prices from falling to a lower, 
more competitive level. (professor Lande was an attorney and Professor Salop an economic con-
sultant for the plaintiff in the Reazin case.) 
78. The conclusion that the firm or group of firms lacks market power also may be invalid for 
merger analysis, the purpose for which the test was designed criginally. Applying the Justice De-
partment's test to a group of expressly or tacitly colluding firms that succeeded in raising the price 
to the monopoly level (where it is constrained by competition from substitute goods or from finns 
outside the cartel), the Justice Department would find the relevant market included the substitutes. 
Thus, the Justice Department would allow the conspirators to merge, thereby perfecting their collu-
sion and reducing the likelihood that prices would fall in the future. 
79. A similar issue also arises in merger analysis, of course. See supra note 78 (discussing lack of 
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5. Market Share Thresholds in Determining Market Power 
The conventional test of monopoly power in cases brought under section 
two of the Sherman Act involves measuring the market share of the exclud-
ing firm, however the market is defined. As stated by Judge Learned Hand, a 
market share of ninety percent "is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is 
doubtful whether sixty . . . percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-
three percent is not."80 Use of market share as a proxy for market power has 
rightfully been criticized for ignoring other important market information 
such as the ability of competing firms to expand or of new competitors to 
enter.81 At the extreme, the theory of contestability shows that even a firm 
with a 100% market share may have no ability to raise price or collect mo-
nopoly profits under certain, albeit highly restrictive, circumstances. 82 
More important, the use of market share for gauging the degree of Bainian 
market power to exclude competitors profitably by raising their costs is 
somewhat different than its role in detecting classical, Stiglerian market 
power. First, market share has independent significance and is not just a 
proxy for residual demand elasticity. The greater the disparity in market 
shares between the firm seeking to raise its rivals' costs and the rivals, the 
greater the firm's anticipated reward for achieving a higher price for its out-
put. Hence, such a firm would be willing to spend more in attempting to 
exclude rivals to gain power over price.83 It follows that, in evaluating an 
excluding firm's ability to outbid its rivals for the right to exclude them, the 
excluding firm's relative market share usually provides Ii helpful gauge. 84 
market power and merger analysis). By using the current price as the benchmark for its "five 
percent test" of market definition and market power. the Justice Department implicitly made the 
policy judgment that it will proscribe only those mergers that would raise prices above the current 
level. It will not preserve the likelihood of future price decreases by blocking mergers that may 
prevent the market from becoming more competitive in the future. 
80. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am .• 148 F.2d 416. 424 (2d Cir. 1945). 
81. See Cargill. Inc. v. Monfort of Colo .• Inc .• 107 S. Ct. 484. 495 n.17 (1986) (it is "important to 
examine the barriers to entry into the market. because 'without barriers to entry it would presuma-
bly be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time.''') (quoting Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp .• 475 U.S. 574. 591 n.15 (1986)); see also United States v. 
Waste Management. 743 F.2d 976. 982 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing effect of mergers on entry). As 
demonstrated by Landes and Posner and others. Stiglerian market power involves the elasticity of 
(residual) demand for a firm or group of firms. Market share sometimes is a highly imperfect proxy 
for this elasticity. Landes & Posner. supra note 40. at 947; see Ordover. Sykes & Willig. Herfindahl 
Concentration. Rivalry and Mergers. 95 HARV. L. REv. 1857. 1859-63 (1982) (setting forth formula 
to calculate market power for individual firms). See generally Baker & Bresnahan. The Gains/rom 
Merger or Collusion in Product-Differentiated Industries. 33 J. INDUS. EcON. 427 (1985) (presenting 
mathematical approach). 
82. Baumol. On Contestable Market Analysis. 195 CoNF. BOARD REs. BULL. 13. 13 (1986). See 
generally W. BAUMOL. J. PANZAR & R. WILLIG. CoNTESTABLE MARKETS (1982). 
83. Krattenmaker & Salop. supra note 25, at 268-72. 
84. If other firms are excluded, unexcluded rival firms still may be able to expand. In that case, 
barriers to expansion (at constant cost) for unexcluded competitors also are relevant. Under some 
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Further, the firms' relative purchases of inputs may provide useful informa-
tion about their relative bargaining power over input suppliers in bidding for 
exclusionary rights.8s Finally, the usefulness of market share information in 
analyzing Bainian market power may be hampered by the market definition 
problem discussed above; the market may be defined incorrectly because the 
"price rise" test precludes treating a true monopolist as a relevant market.86 
Contrary to Judge Hand's intimation, there should be no explicit market 
share requirement in a section two exclusion case, although one may wish to 
create a "safe harbor" for cases involving trivial market shares. The inquiry 
should instead focus directly on the ability of the firm to raise its price by 
raising its rivals' costS.87 Market share, therefore, provides some useful in-
formation for the analysis of Bainian market power. However, it should be 
one factor to consider, not the focus of the analysis. 
6. Legal Standards Governing the Acquisition and Exercise 
of Market Power 
The foregoing discussion reveals that distinguishing between what we have 
called Stiglerian and Bainian market power also is helpful in working out the 
proper answer to the problem, highlighted in the Alcoa case, that infects 
analysis of monopoly claims under section two of the Sherman Act: does the 
statute condemn the acquisition, or merely the exercise, of monopoly power? 
In some important cases, the correct answer is that it depends on which type 
of monopoly power is at issue. 
First, if a single firm achieves either Bainian or Stiglerian market power by 
accident, by government largess, or solely by superior skill, foresight and 
industry, it acquires that power lawfully, i.e., without violating section two. 
These conclusions follow from settled case law and from the premise that the 
Sherman Act is an anticonspiracy and antimonopolization statute, not an 
anticompetition act.88 
Second, a single firm that lawfully has acquired Stiglerian market power is 
permitted, without violating section 2 of the Sherman Act, to exercise that 
circumstances, the market share of a rival may provide a reasonable proxy of the barriers it faces to 
expansion. 
85. For example, if the excluding firm ties its own input purchases to the supplier's willingness to 
grant exclusionary rights, then the supplier who refuses to sell the rights loses profits on the exclud-
ing firm's input sales. Thus, the supplier must compare the lost input sales to rivals if it grants 
exclusionary rights to the excluding firm against the lost input sales to the excluding firm if it does 
not. The firms' relative output market shares may provide a rough proxy for the relative losses of 
input sales. 
86. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing "Cellophane fallacy"). 
87. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 25, at 230-72 (providing details of this type of 
analysis). 
88. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). The legislative history is more 
problematic than the case law. See Lande, supra note 11, at 91 n.105. 
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power by raising price and restraining its own output in that market. This 
follows from the argument, carefully set out by Donald Turner, that federal 
courts cannot take on the burden of detecting and remedying such price-
setting behavior without becoming, in effect, public utility regulatory com-
missions.89 For example, if a firm owns the only movie theater in a relevant 
geographic market capable of supporting only one movie theater, courts can 
prevent its pricing above the competitive level only by constantly monitoring 
the theater~s prices and costs. 
Third, in contrast, a single firm that has lawfully acquired Bainian exclu-
sionary market power does not have unbridled license to exercise it. It is 
unclear under current law whether the exercise of Bainian power is ever per-
mitted.90 If it is, a firm lawfully may exercise Bainian power only if the 
resulting power over price is more than offset by gains in efficiency.91 A firm 
that could exercise Bainian power by entering into exclusive contracts with 
input suppliers would not further any antitrust goal unless the exclusivity 
provisions of the contract also thereby reduced its own costs sufficiently to 
provide an efficiency justification. Moreover, unlike the difficulties facing 
courts in detecting and remedying Stiglerian power, the exercise of Bainian 
power often involves a discrete, relatively observable practice that can be 
detected and enjoined.92 
Fourth, the Sherman Act should prevent groups of firms from acquiring 
either Stiglerian or Bainian market power, or a dangerous probability 
thereof, by collusion, joint venture, or merger, absent a showing that suffi-
cient overriding efficiencies are expected from the horizontal combination. 
This follows from the related precepts that the antitrust legality of horizontal 
combinations should be judged antecedent to their formation and that it is 
administratively difficult to disentangle firms after they have been inte-
grated.93 Perhaps the law might be more permissive in permitting combina-
tions that threaten to yield Bainian power because, in contrast to Stiglerian 
power, Bainian power sometimes is easier to detect and remedy when exer-
cised.94 For example, the law might proscribe combinations likely to lead 
89. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Re-
fusal to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 681 (1962); cJ. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A 
Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562, 1588-93 (1969) (discussing problem of remedy for 
Sherman Act violations). Turner's objection may not apply to certain other practices. 
90. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 25, at 278-79. 
91. Issues concerning what efficiencies to recognize, what magnitude is necessary, what standard 
of liability, and what evidence should be employed are explored id. at 277-82. 
92. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 25, at 227-30 (defining exclusionary rights and provid-
ing examples of remediable practices); see also infra note 94. 
93. See T. BRUNNER, T. KRATTENMAKER, R. SKITOL & A. WEBSTER, supra note 4, at 151-52 
(discussing pre-merger notification). 
94. The exercise of Bainian power is not always easier to detect and remedy than the exercise of 
Stiglerian power. Bainian power sometimes involves "overbuying" inputs or paying more for inputs 
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only to Bainian power only where entry barriers and concentration are 
higher. 
Fifth, standards governing the exercise of Bainian market power should be 
more restrictive where the defendant firm or firms also have the ability to 
exercise Stiglerian power. This is because the existence of Stiglerian power 
increases the profitability, and hence the likelihood, of successfully exercising 
Bainian power.95 It also increases the resulting efficiency losses.96 This the-
ory provides an additional rationale for more stringent standards governing 
potentially exclusionary Bainian conduct by firms that already have achieved 
significant Stiglerian market power, a "monopoly" in traditional legal 
parlance. 
7. Competitor Standing 
Antitrust policy in some significant measure is dependent on private en-
forcement for its effectiveness. Private enforcement actions are authorized, 
however, only for those who, because of the alleged violation, suffer "anti-
trust injury"; that is, the type of harm antitrust is designed to prevent.97 
Recently, critics have questioned the legitimacy of allowing rivals to sue 
their competitors for antitrust violations.98 If the conduct complained of is 
truly anticompetitive-that is, if it has the effect of raising or maintaining 
prices above competitive levels in the market-then one may ask how the 
complainant-rival is hurt. These critics argue that the rival firm should bene-
fit from higher price levels. It gains the ability to choose between reducing 
its own output to raise price along with its malefactor-competitor or ex-
panding its output at competitive levels to take up the slack. 
This argument may be well taken when the sole asserted harm is the acqui-
sition of Stiglerian power. Bainian power, however, can simultaneously ben-
efit the firm that acquires it, by allowing the firm to raise price and also harm 
the firm's excluded rivals by raising their costs. Thus, even if competitors 
should presumptively be denied standing to complain of acts that allegedly 
threaten to create, maintain, or facilitate Stiglerian market power, no such 
presumption should operate in those cases where Bainian power is alleged. 
In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,99 for example, the Supreme 
Court held that a rival could seek to enjoin a merger of its competitors if it 
in exchange for subtle exclusionary rights. See also supra note 54 (exercise of Bainian power often 
entails greater production inefficiencies than exercise of Stiglerian power). 
95. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 25, at 266-77. 
96. See infra text accompanying note 114. 
97. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
98. See T. BRUNNER, T. KRAITENMAKER, R. SKITOL & A. WEBSTER, supra note 4, at 218-20 
(discussing third-party merger litigation). 
99. 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986). 
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could show a reasonable likelihood of antitrust injury.1oo However, in 
reaching its conclusion that the plaintiff Monfort had not asserted such a 
claim, the Court ignored the fact that Monfort apparently alleged and the 
lower courts found a potentially exclusionary cost-raising strategy, instead 
of, or in addition to, the price-cutting tactics on which the Court focused. 
Monfort's claim, stated the Court, was that defendant "Excel would bid 
up the price it would pay for cattle, and reduce the price at which it sold 
boxed beef."IOI The first part of this allegation ("raising the price of cattle") 
could be, of course, the classic technique of "overbuying" inputs, presumably 
to raise rivals' costs more than one's own. I02 Yet, in analyzing Monfort's 
allegations of a "cost-price squeeze," the Court focused only on the pricing 
component and ignored the cost element.103 It therefore perceived only two 
potential injury theories-above-cost price predation and below-cost price 
predation. The Court did not discuss possible cost-raising strategies in its 
analysis of either theory. Thus, the Court's taxonomy and analysis of an-
ticompetitive injury theories were incomplete. I04 
V. CONCLUSION 
Market power and monopoly power, as those terms are employed in anti-
trust law, are not separate and distinct concepts but should be understood to 
refer to the same phenomenon-the ability to price above the competitive 
level. For purposes of antitrust analysis, the crucial distinction is not be-
tween market power and monopoly power, but between two fundamentally 
100. Id. at 495. 
101. Id. at 491. 
102. This could occur, for example, if the defendant (1) produced internally a significantly 
greater share of its own cattle, (2) protected itself with a long-temI contract to purchase cattle at a 
fixed price, or (3) enjoyed significantly greater bargaining power over suppliers than its rivals. 
Under any of these circumstances, an increased price of purchased cattle would raise rivals' costs 
disproportionately. In addition, the purchase of cattle may be localized. If so, a large company 
with plants in a number of geographic markets could bid up prices of cattle in one local market 
without affecting the prices it paid in other markets. Rivals with plants only in the target area 
would find that all their cattle costs went up while the predator would face an increase only at that 
one plant. While it appears that there was some exploration at trial of this strategy, the Cargill 
Court does not appear to have made the critical inquiry that one would have liked. 
103. We do not assert that Cargill was wrongly decided, just that the Court did not properly 
evaluate Monfort's allegations. (Whether this was the fault of the courts or Monfort's counsel is a 
separate issue.) Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower court opinions set out a detailed analysis 
of possible cost-raising allegations. Thus, we cannot tell whether the proffered allegation involved 
"overbuying" inputs for the purpose of raising rivals' cost or whether an increased price of cattle is 
simply the natural outcome of a procompetitive increase in industry output, perhaps arising out of 
cost savings flowing from the merger. 
104. In fact, cost-raising techniques could fOmI the basis of claims that price cuts that remain . 
above cost can be anticompetitive. By raising its rivals' costs, the predator gains an immediate 
advantage in selling output without the need to sacrifice profits in the short run. Indeed, it has no 
need to drive the competitor out of the market. Thus, it has no need to lower its price below cost. 
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different ways in which a firm or group of firms may exercise anticompetitive 
economic power-raising one's own prices (classical Stiglerian power) or 
raising competitor's costs (exclusionary Bainian power). 
These two types of power can be exercised singly or in tandem. Further, 
the presence of either type of power is likely to facilitate exercise of the other. 
Consequently, whenever market or monopoly power is an issue in antitrust 
cases, courts should inquire into both Stiglerian and Bainian power; the pres-
ence of either should suffice. 
Recognizing the distinction between these two methods of exercising an-
ticompetitive economic power also can clarify many antitrust questions, in-
cluding the definition of relevant markets, the measurement of market power, 
the treatment of unexercised market power, and competitor standing to sue. 
As courts become more familiar and comfortable with the fact that Stiglerian 
and Bainian power both threaten consumer welfare, we expect antitrust stan-
dards to emerge that explicitly take account of these two forms of anticompe-
titive power. 
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APPENDIX 
The body of this article argues that the concepts of market power and 
monopoly power that antitrust law employs are not distinct concepts, but 
qualitatively identical ones. Both terms refer to the ability of a firm, or group 
of firms, to price above competitive levels. 
The true, and important, distinction is between anticompetitive economic 
power exercised by restraining one's own output (classical, Stiglerian power) 
and that exercised by restricting rivals' output (exclusionary, Bainian power). 
This appendix restates some of the analysis behind that distinction and pro-
vides a somewhat more formal, technical illustration. 
As discussed in the text, a single firm or group of firms may profitably 
raise price in two ways. First, it may raise price above the competitive level 
directly by restraining its own output ("control price"). We denote this 
power to raise price profitably by restraining one's own output as classical or 
"Stiglerian" market power. Second, a firm or group of firms may raise price 
above the competitive level by raising its rivals' costs and thereby causing 
them to restrain their output ("exclude competition"). We denote this power 
as exclusionary or "Bainian" market power. Either way consumer welfare is 
reduced because output below the efficient competitive level denies consum-
ers products that they value in excess of the marginal cost of production and 
transfers wealth from consumers to producers. In addition, for Bainian mar-
ket power, production efficiency also is reduced. These two sources of power 
over price can occur either independently or simultaneously. 
We can illustrate these concepts by considering a hypothetical market for 
a hypothetical good called widgets. Consider Stiglerian power first. If there 
are no good substitutes for widgets and only one firm produces widgets, that 
single firm will have the ability to exercise Stiglerian monopoly power di-
rectly by reducing its output and raising its (and, therefore, the market) price 
to the monopoly level. This monopoly price and output occurs at the point 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Consumer welfare and alloca-
tive efficiency are sacrificed because the firm foregoes sales to those consum-
ers who would be willing to buy widgets, even at a price above the cost of 
production, but who are unwilling to buy at the monopoly price set by the 
firm. These consumers are harmed because they lose the ability to make 
these beneficial purchases. This also represents a harm to society because 
these benefits, which do not come at the expense of anyone else, are lost. 
This is illustrated in figure 1, where the marginal cost curve of the widget 
monopolist is denoted by S and demand for widgets by D. As drawn, the 
monopolist has a constant marginal cost up to its production capacity, de-
noted by K. Rather than setting the competitive quantity Qc and competitive 
price Peat the point where price equals marginal cost, the monopolist sets a 
higher price Pm and reduces its output to Qm, the point where marginal reve-
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nue equals marginal cost. lOS The deadweight efficiency loss is shown by the 







Exclusionary Bainian market power can be described by the following ex-
ample. Suppose that 100 firms with identical, constant supply curves (con-
stant marginal cost functions) make widgets, and that each produces an 
equal amount. Given this market structure, suppose further that gadgets, a 
second product, are the only good substitute for widgets and vice versa; gad-
gets and widgets therefore are in the same market. Suppose also that the 
widget manufacturers take steps that significantly raise the costs of manufac-
turing gadgets. This cost increase would represent an exercise in Bainian 
monopoly power. 
As the increased cost of gadget production leads gadget producers to 
shrink their output, the price of widgets will rise. Widget makers will benefit 
as their outputs and market shares increase. Their total profits rise while 
consumers lose the ability to buy at the lower, competitive price. In this 
105. For simplicity, the marginal revenue curve is not pictured in figure 1. 
106. If marginal cost were rising with output, there would also be a deadweight loss in producer 
surplus. 
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example, widget firms have exercised Bainian market power, even though 
they could not exercise Stiglerian market power. Consumer welfare and allo-
cative efficiency are reduced. 
This is illustrated in figure 2, where S denotes the competitive supply curve 
of a market comprised of gadgets plus widgets. Total capacity of widget 
producers is denoted by Ko and total capacity of widget producers plus 
gadget producers is denoted by K.I07 The increase in the cost of gadgets is 
represented by the upward shift in the supply curve from S to S' .108 Even if 
competition maintains a price where demand equals marginal cost, the price 
rises from PI to P2, while quantity falls from QI to Q2' The efficiency loss 
involves both the deadweight loss in consumer surplus from the output re-
duction, illustrated by the cross-hatched area ABCl09 and also the loss in 
production efficiency, that is, the increased costs of producing the remaining 
output, illustrated by the cross-hatched rectangle EABF. 
For firms that have both classical and exclusionary. market power, these 
results can be derived directly from the Lerner Index.110 The Lerner Index is 
the standard definition of the price-cost-margin of a firm in terms of its 





ed + e. (1 - s) 
where L is the Lerner Index, s is the market share of the dominant firm, ed is 
the market demand elasticity, and es is the elasticity of supply of the competi-
tive fringe. lIl Exclusionary practices can be analyzed in the formula as de-
creases in the elasticity of supply of the fringe competitors.112 
The analyses underlying figures 1 and 2 show how Bainian power and 
Stiglerian power can exist independently of each other. Moreover, it follows 
107. Thus, the total production capacity of gadget producers is the difference, K-Ko. 
108. In general, the characteristics of the upward shift in the supply curve depend on the techni-
cal characteristics of the cost increase and the incidence of the cost increase on different gadget 
producing firms. The "parallel" shift illustrated would arise from a constant increase in the con-
stant marginal cost of all gadget producers, unaccompanied by any cost increase to widget produ-
cers. Thus, the supply curve only shifts up for units produced with the K-Ko capacity of gadget 
producers. 
109. With this supply curve, there is no producer surplus. 
110. The Lerner Index, named after its inventor, Abba Lerner, is the difference between price 
and marginal cost as a fraction of the price, or (P-MC)/P. The Lerner Index ranges from zero for a 
perfect competitor up to 1/e.J for a monopolist, where ed is the demand elasticity. 
111. For a derivation and discussion of this formula, see Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 945. 
See also Salop, Scheffman & Schwartz, A Bidding Analysis of Special Interest Regulation: Raising 
Rivals' Costs in a Rent-Seeking Society, in THE POLmCAL EcONOMY OF REGULATION: PRIVATE 
INTERESTS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 102, 106 (1984) (derivation of analogous formula for 
perfectly competitive market). 
112. Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 945. 






that the exercise of Bainian -power also can create Stiglerian power. For ex-
ample, once the gadget producers' costs have been increased, they will pro-
vide less of a constraint on tacit or express collusion by the widget producers. 
If the market is sufficiently concentrated and there are barriers to entry into 
that market,113 perhaps as a result of the cost increasing strategy, then the 
widget producers may be able to restrain output and raise price still further. 
As illustrated in figure 2, output may fall and price may rise to the cartel 
level, represented by point M, leading to a further efficiency loss. 
The harms from classical Stiglerian and exclusionary Bainian powers rein-
force one another in a second way. The preexistence of classical Stiglerian 
market power also increases the size of the efficiency loss from the exercise of 
exclusionary Bainian market power.114 This is illustrated in figure 3 for the 
case of constant marginal cost, denoted by S. As in figure 1, pre-existing 
Stiglerian market power yields an initial price'P above marginal cost, and a 
consumer deadweight loss of ABC. Suppose, by raising rivals' costs, the firms 
exercising Stiglerian power are also able to exercise Bainian power and raise 
113. The necessary barriers to entry and expansion are represented by the capacity constraints. 
114. See Jackson, The Consideration of Economics in Merger Cases, 43 U. CHI. J. Bus. 439, 443 
(1970) (when additional market power is added into new competitive situation, efficiency losses 
increase). 
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market price further to Pl. In that case, the additional deadweight loss in 
consumer surplus from the further price rise to PI equals the cross-hatched 




115. This deadweight loss is in addition to any losses in production efficiency, which are not 
illustrated. . 
